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We know that the costs of implementing various climate change mitigation policies are not uniformly
distributed across individuals in society, but we do not know to what extent this unequal cost dis-
tribution inﬂuences public support for these various policies. This study shows that cost distribution is an
important explanation for variations in public support for various climate policies. Using individual-level
data on industry of employment and support for a range of climate policies, we ﬁnd that those employed
in the fossil fuel industry are less likely to support climate policies that are particularly costly to their
industry, but are as likely as everybody else to support policies with lower costs to the industry. This
ﬁnding challenges the traditional bifurcation between climate change "skeptics" and "acceptors." Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd that opposition to renewable energy by large fossil fuel producers and consumers,
identiﬁed in the political economy literature, is not uniformly found among these companies’ employees.
The most important implication of this study for policy makers is that support for climate policies is
sensitive to the compensation of exposed groups and stimulation of alternative avenues for employment.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Economic interests and attitudes toward mitigation
To what extent do the costs and opportunities of different cli-
mate change mitigation measures affect policy support at the in-
dividual level? While there is close to full scientiﬁc consensus that
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from human activities
constitute a leading cause of climate change, and that such change
represents a danger to human settlements, food production, and
water supply (Battisti and Naylor, 2009), there is less political
consensus on what types of policies and measures should be im-
plemented to avoid its worst effects. Furthermore, which mitiga-
tion policies get implemented depends less on aggregate cost-
beneﬁt analyses than on patterns of organized interests andLtd. This is an open access article u
innereim),notably on whether costs and beneﬁts of policies are concentrated
or diffuse (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013; Hughes and Urpelainen,
2015; Meckling et al., 2015). Consequently, understanding the so-
cio-economic foundations of policy support and opposition is
important both for explaining which mitigation policies get im-
plemented and for formulating successful policies in the future.
We argue that support for and opposition to various mitigation
policies depend on speciﬁc, individual economic interest linked to
each policy, and that consequently support and opposition may
vary across different types of mitigation policies. This study thus
ﬁlls two gaps in the literature. First, we provide a detailed analysis
of the potential gains and losses from speciﬁc mitigation policies
or policy proposals from the point of view of individuals working
in the fossil fuel sector. Second, we examine variation in attitudes
toward these policies among sector employees and the public at
large, ﬁnding variation in support and opposition levels according
to the potential costs and beneﬁts of each speciﬁc policy.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
E. Tvinnereim, E. Ivarsﬂaten / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 364–371 365Traditional economic models of climate change mitigation as-
sume a high degree of economic rationality and a benevolent
planner aiming to identify optimal solutions (Clarke et al., 2009;
Kriegler et al., 2014). More recently, economic models have
emerged that seek to integrate national diversity in policy strength
and policy timing (Tavoni et al., 2015). These studies may be useful
for identifying new, non-intuitive policy solutions or optima, but
lack ﬁrm grounding in the complex empirical world of interest
politics.
The distribution of costs and beneﬁts among various interest
groups matters because the likelihood of passage and successful
implementation often depends on the relative conﬁguration of
winners and losers from a policy. For example, the policy that
made Germany a world leader in wind energy was only partly
motivated by a wish to mitigate GHG emissions. Rather, a coalition
of farmers, skilled workers from a declining shipbuilding industry,
and politicians from economically depressed regions promoted the
sector (Michaelowa, 2005). Importantly, the wind industry’s ability
to produce new jobs helped it overcome the opposition caused by
its high costs.
Looking at the issue of renewable energy promotion in reverse,
Aklin and Urpelainen (2013) suggest that OECD governments are
less likely to support cleaner forms of power production when
fossil fuels dominate the electricity sector, due to the political clout
of incumbent producers. Furthermore, beyond industrial structure,
the form of political interest representation matters for which
types of climate policy get implemented (Hughes and Urpelainen,
2015). The impact of economic interests on climate policy support
and opposition can for example be seen from the fact that mem-
bers of the US Congress vote on climate legislation in a way that is
predictable based on their districts' carbon intensity (Cragg et al.,
2012). Similarly, the likelihood of US local governments develop-
ing mitigation plans is found to correlate negatively with the de-
gree to which fossil fuel extraction plays a role in local economic
activity (Zahran et al., 2008).
Economic interests also inﬂuence public opinion related to
climate change at the individual level. One study conducted in the
US, Germany, France, and the UK shows that the carbon intensity
of an individual's employment sector correlates negatively with
individual support for participation in international climate co-
operation (Bechtel et al., 2014). More generally, employment in oil
and gas extraction in Norway has a negative effect on individuals'
propensity to agree that climate change constitutes a threat
(Tvinnereim and Austgulen, 2014). By contrast, a German study
shows that individuals who display skepticism toward climate
science are less likely to support renewable energy, but ﬁnds no
association between employment type or unemployment and
climate skepticism (Engels et al., 2013). Thus, there is evidence
that distributive concerns inﬂuence attitudes toward climate pol-
icy, but these attitudes have so far been of a unidimensional kind,
ranging from general opposition to general support.
The political economy literature suggests that different policy
proposals should garner different levels of support according to
their respective expected costs and beneﬁts to speciﬁc groups.
Notably, broad-based mitigation policies such as carbon taxes of-
ten produce concentrated costs to well-organized groups such as
fossil fuel companies, while producing diffuse beneﬁts to the po-
pulation at large. As a consequence, Meckling et al. (2015) argue
that policies that promote selected “green” industries with new
sources of employment and future lobbying potential are more
likely to succeed in the long run than more universal carbon taxes
or caps. These results also imply a potential differentiation of
public opinion whereby individuals tied to fossil fuel producers
(e.g., the oil and gas industry) or consumers (e.g., coal-ﬁred power
plants) should oppose policies producing concentrated costs to
their sector while supporting or showing indifference to policieswith more diffuse costs to their industries.
A number of studies examine the public’s willingness to sup-
port different climate policy proposals, yet no study has to our
knowledge attempted to explain variation in support across po-
licies with reference to economic interests. Policies evaluated in
these surveys may range from renewable energy support via
building energy efﬁciency to gasoline taxes (Krosnick and Ma-
cInnis, 2013); some studies also gauge the public’s willingness to
pay for various kinds of climate policy (Aldy et al., 2012; Kotchen
et al., 2013). A clear tendency across this research is that proposals
involving support for renewable energy garner more support than
tax increases. Yet few studies exist that seek to explain variation
across individuals for different types of proposals. Indeed, in some
cases (e.g., Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), the various policy pro-
posals are combined in an index, underlining the fact that atten-
tion is concentrated on general rather than speciﬁc policy support.
The political economy of climate change mitigation implies that
different types of policies should have different levels of support
also at the individual level. Our present study asks speciﬁcally how
individuals employed in the fossil fuel industry evaluate a set of
mitigation policies with different effects on their economic inter-
ests in the form of employment prospects.
Distributional concerns have an additional potential for solving
a problem in the study of public perceptions of climate change.
Recent research casts climate change as a complex issue, in rela-
tion to which people tend to base their views on cues from their
peer groups or from trusted sources such as selected political
leaders (Kahan et al., 2012; Malka et al., 2009). Once established,
this strain of studies ﬁnd that motivated reasoning – by which
"people routinely seek out and accept evidence that supports their
existing views, while ignoring or discounting disconﬁrming evi-
dence" (Whitmarsh, 2011) – makes the selected views more re-
silient. However, it remains unexplained where these group opi-
nions and identities originate. Economic interests may play this
role as a ﬁrst mover.
Our study uses data from a nationally representative survey in
a country where a substantial share of the working-age population
has a direct interest in the fossil fuel industry—Norway. Here,
about eight per cent of the workforce are employed in oil and gas
production or closely related industries (Eika et al., 2010); others
estimate up to 13% (Blomgren et al., 2015). The high fossil fuel
share of total employment means that there will be enough re-
spondents in this category in a national poll to produce statisti-
cally meaningful results – no oversampling of the sector is needed.
The IPCC divides policy instruments into economic instruments
(taxes, tradable allowances, and subsidies), regulatory approaches,
information programs, government provision of public goods and
services, and voluntary actions (Somanathan et al., 2014 Ta-
ble 15.2). Key sectors are energy, transport, buildings, industry,
forestry/land use, and human settlements/infrastructure. Notable
policies include subsidies for renewable energy (Blyth et al., 2009),
cap-and-trade for electricity and heavy industry emissions (Tvin-
nereim, 2013), emission or fuel economy standards in transpor-
tation and buildings, and measures to protect tropical rainforests.
Our classiﬁcation of policy proposals differs from the estab-
lished literature as we discern between policies based on detailed
analysis of their expected effects on people working in the fossil
fuels industry. For example, limits on new oil and gas exploration
is classiﬁed as negative for fossil fuel employment because fewer
wells will be drilled. By contrast, support for geothermal energy
may produce new employment opportunities for individuals and
companies already specializing in drilling. An intermediate posi-
tion may be occupied by cap-and-trade, which imposes a price on
GHG emissions but which could be seen as more ﬂexible for the oil
and gas industry, given high abatement costs, than outright reg-
ulation or a high CO2 tax.
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employed in the oil and gas sector to exhibit a pattern of support
for or opposition to climate policies that depends on the nature of
the policy in question. Speciﬁcally, if the proposal is directly costly
to individuals employed in the fossil fuels industry, then we expect
this group to oppose the policy more than other groups in society
do. If, however, the climate policy proposal does not place speciﬁc
and direct costs on individuals with skills associated with fossil
fuel extraction, we expect this group to support the policy as much
as other groups in society support it. Finally, for policies that may
produce new opportunities for employment, we expect similar or
even higher support for the proposals among oil and gas em-
ployees compared to the population at large.
Our results display the expected pattern of policy support
across seven different mitigation policy proposals for the energy
sector. Notably, three policies which would impose signiﬁcant
constraints on activity in the oil and gas sector receive much less
support among those employed in the sector. Conversely, four
policies with more diffuse costs and potential beneﬁts show in-
signiﬁcant differences in support between oil/gas employees and
the rest of the Norwegian population. We therefore argue that
future studies of the interest politics of climate change should not
conceive policy support in unidimensional terms, but rather pay
close attention to variation in the distributional consequences of
different types of climate policies. Speciﬁcally, effects on employ-
ment – whether positive or negative – are likely to play a key role
in the success or failure of mitigation policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next
section details the seven mitigation policies evaluated in our sur-
vey. The subsequent section outlines our data and estimation
procedure. Section four presents the results, whereas the ﬁnal
section concludes and draws implications for policy and future
research.1 Revised national budget for 2013, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, p. 10.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm2. Classiﬁcation of mitigation policies by expected impacts on
employment
Our study focuses on seven different mitigation measures that
vary with respect to the costs they entail for the fossil fuel work-
force. Three of the measures impose particularly high costs on the
fossil fuel workforce, because they imply direct constraints on oil
and gas production or new investments; three measures are low
cost, because they involve support for emission reduction tech-
nology; while one ﬁnal measure has an intermediate position.
2.1. High-cost policies
Reducing oil production Since most of Norwegian-produced
fossil fuels are exported and burned elsewhere, their contribution
to the national emission budget is limited. Nevertheless, meeting
the internationally agreed two-degree target would involve leav-
ing much of fossil fuels undeveloped, including some oil and gas
(McGlade and Ekins, 2015; Meinshausen et al., 2009). One strategy
that has been suggested in Norway is to decide not to develop a
certain set of potential oil ﬁelds, thus reducing Norwegian oil and
gas production. We ask respondents whether this is a climate
policy tool they support.
Postponing Lofoten oil exploration The waters off the Lofoten
archipelago in Northern Norway constitute a potential new area
for oil and gas production. One proposal supported by several
political parties would keep the area off limits for oil and gas ex-
ploration. The area harbors rich ﬁsheries and great natural beauty
and has great symbolic value for the environmental movement of
Norway. Others see great potential employment and business
opportunities from relatively accessible oil and gas ﬁelds, notablyat a time of declining activity in the industry.
Tightening the exploration tax regime would imply stronger ﬁs-
cal constraints on prospecting for new oil and gas ﬁelds. The
combined tax on fossil fuel extraction in Norway is currently 78%
of proﬁts. In return, oil and gas companies are entitled to a refund
of a corresponding percentage of their exploration costs from the
Norwegian government, strongly incentivizing companies to look
for new ﬁelds (most of the revenue from which will befall the
state) but at the same time supporting risky ventures as failed
exploration will cost companies limited amounts. Calls have
therefore been made to tighten this tax regime so as to reduce
government ﬁnancial risk from exploration that yields either no
result or results with costs too high to make them proﬁtable in a
world of carbon constraints and lower oil prices, producing
stranded assets among so-called "unburnable" resources (McGlade
and Ekins, 2015). A tightening by two percentage points was ef-
fected in 2013.1
2.2. Policy with ambiguous cost
Tighten emission ceiling Heavy industry installations in Norway
are subject to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS),
which caps the overall emissions of 14,000 facilities across Europe
and covers almost half the EU's emissions. Companies receive or
buy allowances to pollute, and may use these to cover their own
annual emissions or sell them at a market price to others. The
aggregate nature of the ETS cap means that companies able to
reduce emissions at low cost (such as coal-ﬁred power generators)
may sell surplus allowances to companies facing a higher abate-
ment cost (such as steel mills and oil/gas drilling).
While the EU ETS thus introduces a price on GHG emissions, it
enables oil and gas producers to pay others to reduce emissions
rather than demanding absolute cuts within the sector. Further-
more, the ETS has to some extent replaced a higher national
Norwegian carbon dioxide (CO2) tax on oil and gas drilling. Finally,
a European CO2 price favors lower-emitting gas-ﬁred power plants
over coal, increasing demand for North Sea gas. It would also favor
fossil fuels extracted with low emissions from the production
process, an advantage asserted by producers on the Norwegian
continental shelf. For these reasons, and despite the overall CO2
constraints, the Norwegian Oil Industry Association favors the EU
ETS (Norwegian Oil Industry Association, 2014).
2.3. Low-cost policies/opportunities
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) involves capturing CO2 from
combustion processes and storing it underground for millennia.
The technique has been considered to have great potential for
reducing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. Notably, CCS
with biofuels constitutes an essential ingredient in models in-
cluding negative emissions by the end of this century needed to
reach the politically determined two-degree target for global
warming (Kriegler et al., 2014). CCS is also one of the four areas
where EU legislation has been passed to reach the union's 2020
climate and energy goals.2 However, CCS project implementation
has so far fallen short of projections (Scott et al., 2013). In Norway,
a CCS project for the Mongstad reﬁnery constituted a ﬂagship
climate policy initiative for the Stoltenberg coalition government
(2005–13) but was canceled at the end of the cabinet's tenure
amid cost overruns and political controversy around its effective-
ness (Mildenberger, 2015).
CCS projects are typically developed by companies in the fossil
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for ﬁrms and individuals in the sector. CCS is a capital-intensive
technology and political economy studies suggest that government
support is needed beyond traditional carbon pricing to ensure
development and deployment in sufﬁcient volumes (Blyth et al.,
2009; Torvanger and Meadowcroft, 2011). We therefore ask survey
participants to voice their support for or opposition to public ﬁ-
nancing of such projects.
Offshore wind power includes electricity-producing turbines
mounted on the sea ﬂoor and, at the developmental stage, ﬂoating
turbines. While offshore wind plays an important role in the re-
newable energy expansion plans of countries such as Germany, the
UK, and Denmark, Norway has seen little offshore wind because of
cheap hydroelectric power and competition for personnel from
the oil and gas industry. At the same time, offshore wind power
requires many of the same types of technology and skill sets as
those found in the offshore oil and gas extraction industry, and
could thus be a future source of employment for those currently
working in oil and gas.
Geothermal energy production exploits temperature differences
between deep geological formations and the earth's surface to
produce heat and electricity, often using ﬂuids to transport the
heat. Reservoir dynamics constitute a dual-use skill needed in both
oil production and geothermal energy, and specialized drilling
companies ﬁnd applications in the exploitation of both types of
energy (Midttømme et al., 2015). In Norwegian public debate,
geothermal energy is often used as an example of how oil and gas
technology may create a "green" energy transition.3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
Our data were collected in the ﬁrst three waves of the Nor-
wegian Citizen Panel, in the fall of 2013 and in the spring and fall
of 2014 (Ivarsﬂaten et al., 2014a, 2014b). The Norwegian Citizen
Panel is an Internet panel based on random recruitment from the
Norwegian population registry and owned by the University of
Bergen. The sample is representative of the Norwegian population
on most indicators as further discussed in the data documentation
reports.3 Since the study is conducted in Norway where a sizable
share of the workforce is employed in the fossil fuel industry and
since the sample size available for our study is large (N¼6371),
this study affords a rare opportunity to compare the policy pre-
ferences of the fossil fuel workforce to those of the rest of the
population.
New respondents were recruited in the fall of 2013 and 2014. In
2013, 2866 respondents were recruited for this study, among
whom 297 or 10.4% reported working in or closely with the oil and
gas industry. In 2014, the respective numbers were 3124 and 381,
or 10.9% oil/gas workers. The share of respondents working in or in
close connection with the oil and gas sector is similar to that seen
in the population at large (Blomgren et al., 2015; Eika et al., 2010).
The two samples are relatively well-balanced and similar on key
demographic variables such as age and gender, which makes us
conﬁdent to pool respondents from the two recruitment waves.
Table 1 shows balance statistics for Waves 1 and 3 of the
Norwegian Citizen Panel. Overall, young men are somewhat un-
derrepresented, as are older women; by contrast, the share of
middle-aged men is very close to that of the population at large3 The data documentation reports are available from the Norwegian Citizen
Panel website, http://www.uib.no/en/citizen. Reports, codebooks and datasets can
be downloaded from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.while females in this age group are overrepresented (Skjervheim
and Høgestøl, 2014). As might be expected, individuals with higher
education levels are also overrepresented; the same holds for re-
sidents of the capital region. We use weights in the regression
analysis to compensate for this observed bias. The weights are
based on the relative distributions of age, education, gender, and
region in the sample and in the population at large, and give
weights above one for respondents belonging to underrepresented
groups and lower than one for overrepresented groups.
Table 2 shows some key characteristics of the fossil fuel
workforce in our sample. It shows that they are slightly younger
than the population at large, with a median age group of 36–45
relative to 46–55 in the overall sample. The fossil fuel workforce is
furthermore disproportionately male, with 26–28% women de-
pending on category, against a balanced 49% in the overall sample.
As regards education, the share of university or college educated
respondents working directly in the oil and gas industry is similar
to that of the population at large, whereas for those working in-
directly with oil and gas it is somewhat lower. Finally, incomes
were signiﬁcantly higher in the oil industry than among the po-
pulation at large, at 38% above the mean counting both direct and
indirect employment; 46% above for direct oil/gas employment
only.
In sum, the characteristics of the fossil fuel workforce in our
sample squares well with what we know about Norwegians
working in the industry: They are somewhat younger and have
about the same or marginally less education than the population
at large, while consisting of a signiﬁcantly higher share of males
and having considerably higher incomes than average.
3.2. Estimation
We use the following estimation equation:
_ = + + +
+ + +
Policy support Oilwork Age Gender Education
IncomeLOG Region Error
j CAT CAT
CAT
The constituent variables are as follows:
Policy_supportj is the set of dependent variables, representing
the level of support for each of the seven mitigation measures
detailed in Section 2 (see Appendix for question wording). All
variables are standardized on a 0–1 scale.
Oilwork is the key explanatory variable. It equals one if the
respondent reports working in the oil/gas industry, or in a busi-
ness closely related to this industry (see Appendix for question
wording). All others are coded as zero.
The following variables are included as controls:
AgeCAT consists of ﬁve dummy variables indicating age cate-
gories 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and 66 and above. Ages 18–25
constitute the reference category. The variable is based on the
registry data from which the survey participants were sampled. In
order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents, age is not
made available in exact years.
Gender is one for female, zero for male, based on registry data.
EducationCAT consists of three dummy variables indicating the
following educational levels: High school, college/university, and
no response. The reference category represents no education/pri-
mary school.
IncomeLOG is the natural logarithm of the respondent’s self-re-
ported annual income in Norwegian crowns (NOK).
RegionCAT contains ﬁve dummy variables indicating the re-
spondent’s region, based on registry data. The values are East,
South, West, Central, North; the Oslo area is the reference
category.
In addition, for the questions about changes to the oil tax re-
gime and the cap-and-trade system, dummy variables are in-
troduced to control for slight variations in wording, see Appendix.
Table 1
Balance statistics for Norwegian Citizen Panel, waves 1 and 3.
Source: Skjervheim and Høgestøl (2014), Table 6.
Population Wave 1 Wave 3
Men (%) Women (%) Men (%) Women (%) Men (%) Women (%)
No edu./elementary school 18–29 years 4.5 3.6 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.1
Upper secondary education 4.0 3.3 4.9 4.3 4.1 3.8
University/university college 1.9 3.0 2.7 3.7 2.6 3.9
No edu./elementary school 30–59 years 6.4 5.5 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.6
Upper secondary education 11.9 9.2 10.4 8.3 10.4 7.9
University/university college 8.4 10.7 15.8 18.7 14.5 20.3
No edu./elementary school 60 and above 3.4 5.2 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.8
Upper secondary education 6.2 7.0 4.4 3.2 4.4 3.2
University/university college 3.1 2.6 7.3 5.2 8.1 5.8
Education, age, and gender distributions are given for the population at large and for the new recruitment in each of the waves.
Table 2
Characteristics of survey sample and respondents employed in oil/gas sector.
Oil worker: direct Oil worker: indirect Oil worker: all Remaining sample Full sample
Median age group 36–45 36–45 36–45 46–55 46–55
Share women 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.52 0.49
Share college/university degree 0.6 0.52 0.56 0.62 0.61
Average income (NOK '000) 337 299 318 221 231
Number of respondents 345 333 678 5693 6371
Medians and averages are taken from pooled results from respondents entered in the ﬁrst and third waves of the Norwegian Citizen Panel, 2013–14.
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We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the ﬁve
dependent variables that have a bipolar response scale with seven
categories ranging from “strongly positive” to “strongly negative.”
The exception is the question about reducing oil production,
where logistic regression is used because the variable has a binary
outcome, see Model 3 in Table 3.4. Results
To compare the fossil fuels workforce with the rest of the po-
pulation when it comes to support for various climate policies, we
run regression models with each of our selected policy support
indicators as dependent variables, controlling for age, gender,
education level, and logged income. Table 3 summarizes the re-
sults for the models using control variables. Overall, the tests
support the policy-cost hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, the policies shown
in Models 1-3, which imply concentrated costs for the oil and gas
sector, display strong differences between the fossil fuels work-
force and the rest of the population. Models 4-7, which represent
policies imposing more diffuse costs or even opportunities, show
insigniﬁcant differences. For carbon capture, the coefﬁcient on the
Oilwork variable even shows a positive sign, but the effect remains
small and insigniﬁcant.
Fig. 1 provides a visualization of the main regression results,
based on simulations of expected values with conﬁdence intervals,
setting the Oilwork variable at either zero or one, and keeping all
other explanatory variables at their means. Again, the gaps be-
tween the two groups are particularly clear for the policies related
to tightening the tax regime, postponing drilling in Lofoten and
reducing oil production. Note also that respondents in the oil and
gas sector oppose these policies on average (scores below 0.5)
while the remainder of the population supports them (above 0.5).
Finally, as in Table 3, CCS scores slightly higher among oil and gas
employees than among the remaining population, but the differ-
ence is small and not statistically signiﬁcant. This result likelyrelates to the fact that CCS promotion is the clearest case, among
the seven presented here, of a mitigation measure that generates
opportunities that fall more or less exclusively within the oil and
gas sector.
In addition, a breakdown of the effect of direct oil/gas sector
employment compared with employment closely related to the
sector is given in Supplementary Table 1. As might be expected,
direct oil/gas sector employment has a greater effect than less
direct ties to the industry on individual views on mitigation po-
licies. Still, both groups differ clearly from the remaining popula-
tion when it comes to their views on policies that may harm
employment prospects in the oil and gas sector, while showing no
signiﬁcant difference on the policies with potentially positive ef-
fects on future employment prospects. This is in line with our
overall result that climate mitigation policies are evaluated to a
large extent by individual economic interests and notably on their
effects on employment.5. Conclusions and policy implications
We have shown that employment sector inﬂuences speciﬁc pre-
ferences over climate change mitigation policy using a nationally
representative sample. The ﬁndings have both theoretical and policy
implications. First, and theoretically, we offer an explanation for
variation in preferences across different types of climate policies, and
suggest that taking into account the uneven distribution of costs of
such policies is needed to explain variation in support across them.
Factors that do not vary according to policy, such as cultural cognition
or world views, are, we suggest, less important explanatory factors
when seeking to explain such variation.
Second, our results show that support for climate change mi-
tigation policies is not a unidimensional issue. Rather, levels of
support for various policies depend on characteristics of the
measures themselves, and notably on their potential to generate
new economic activity and employment opportunities. This ﬁnd-
ing suggests that further scholarly work on support for climate
Table 3
Support for mitigation measures with concentrated or diffuse costs for oil/gas workforce.
Oil tax regime Lofoten drilling Reduce oil prod (logit) Tighten CO2 cap Offshore wind Geothermal CCS
Model no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Work with oil/gas 0.100*** 0.105*** 1.552** 0.034 0.013 0.036 0.019
(4.578) (4.895) (2.871) (1.594) (0.368) (1.180) (0.693)
Age: 26–35 0.031 0.004 0.703 0.039 0.034 0.010 0.035
(0.770) (0.113) (1.146) (1.103) (0.615) (0.172) (1.047)
Age: 36–45 0.029 0.011 0.089 0.013 0.002 0.054 0.031
(0.761) (0.328) (0.147) (0.442) (0.045) (0.960) (1.032)
Age: 46–55 0.005 0.030 0.026 0.029 0.053 0.060 0.036
(0.144) (0.906) (0.045) (0.982) (1.043) (1.072) (1.192)
Age: 56–65 0.045 0.001 0.021 0.035 0.061 0.052 0.047
(1.156) (0.016) (0.034) (1.140) (1.095) (0.958) (1.474)
Age: 66 and above 0.011 0.001 0.218 0.056 0.103 0.038 0.051
(0.175) (0.015) (0.224) (1.457) (1.074) (0.504) (1.158)
Gender (F¼1) 0.056*** 0.091*** 0.541* 0.065*** 0.050 0.060* 0.032*
(3.612) (8.310) (2.305) (4.743) (1.937) (2.551) (2.243)
Education: Upper secondary 0.006 0.019 0.559 0.004 0.043 0.026 0.006
(0.212) (0.858) (1.001) (0.167) (0.865) (0.754) (0.228)
Education: University/college 0.066* 0.061** 1.101* 0.062* 0.028 0.015 0.026
(2.379) (2.831) (2.067) (2.513) (0.625) (0.462) (1.067)
Education: No response 0.006 0.000 0.867 0.007 0.048 0.100 0.009
(0.139) (0.010) (1.177) (0.182) (0.744) (1.726) (0.185)
IncomeLOG 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(1.390) (1.161) (0.124) (0.295) (0.554) (0.273) (0.701)
Region: East 0.045* 0.014 0.025 0.037* 0.005 0.011 0.025
(2.187) (0.910) (0.089) (2.043) (0.163) (0.394) (1.265)
Region: South 0.040 0.057* 1.851** 0.054 0.154** 0.085 0.040
(0.986) (2.194) (2.870) (1.897) (2.602) (1.729) (1.243)
Region: West 0.025 0.053*** 0.091 0.010 0.049 0.021 0.016
(1.234) (3.476) (0.317) (0.565) (1.562) (0.658) (0.838)
Region: Central 0.046 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.084 0.033 0.009
(1.661) (0.854) (0.049) (1.300) (1.716) (0.851) (0.394)
Region: North 0.041 0.012 0.846 0.063 0.071 0.045 0.057
(1.125) (0.545) (1.404) (1.786) (1.432) (0.816) (1.793)
Oil tax wording 0.029
(1.946)
Emission cap wording -0.049***
(3.880)
Constant 0.517*** 0.538*** 1.415 0.700*** 0.745*** 0.737*** 0.523***
(8.091) (12.719) (1.551) (13.556) (11.439) (11.677) (9.419)
R-squared 0.081 0.064 0.086 0.059 0.057 0.024
N. of cases 1389 5190 513 1410 534 550 1396
Models 1-3 represent regression analyses of public support for mitigation policies that would bring speciﬁc costs to those currently employed in the Norwegian offshore oil
and gas sector. Policies evaluated in Models 4-7 are more likely to bring more diffuse costs and may generate new employment in roles where experience from offshore oil/
gas would be valuable. The models shown use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on seven-point response scales, except Model 3, which has a binary outcome variable
and uses logistic regression. We control for age, gender, education level, and logged income. Weights are used to compensate for observed bias in age, education, gender, and
region. T-statistics in parentheses (z-scores for Model 3). Dummy variables to control for minor wording variations are included in two cases, see Appendix for details. These
variations are described in Tvinnereim and Steinshamn (2016) but do not affect the substantive results of the present study. Signiﬁcance levels:
*** po0.001.
** po0.01.
* po0.05.
E. Tvinnereim, E. Ivarsﬂaten / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 364–371 369policy needs to pay closer attention to the speciﬁcs of proposed
policies and of the distribution of costs that they entail in given
institutional contexts. That is, political economy needs to be in-
tegrated into the study of public opinion on climate change miti-
gation. Besides fossil fuel employment, suitable explanatory vari-
ables could be work in sectors such as transport or heavy manu-
facturing, or individual consumption patterns such as daily com-
muting distance by car. Conversely, individual employment in re-
newable energy could be used in future studies to explain heigh-
tened support for policies such as feed-in tariffs or other types of
subsidies.
Our results depart from the previous ﬁndings of Hughes and
Urpelainen (2015) and Meckling et al. (2015) in one important
respect. We ﬁnd that support for renewables is as high within the
fossil fuel industry as elsewhere in society, not lower as would
have been implied by their ﬁndings. The diverging results are
likely due to this study´s examination of the individuals working
within the fossil fuel-intensive sectors, rather than of organizedbusiness interests. This potential discrepancy found between the
business and employee level should be followed up in new studies
that directly compare the two.
The sectoral result from our research suggests that mitigation
policies in countries with a substantial fossil fuel sector are un-
likely to succeed if they are seen to reduce employment. The most
important policy implication is that policy makers may beneﬁt
from emphasizing opportunities for individuals rather than new
developments within the framework of fossil fuel extraction and
companies involved in such extraction. Both offshore wind and
geothermal energy represent alternative career paths as well as
new sources of income for fossil fuel companies, whereas CCS may
have the unintended consequence of strengthening the bargaining
power of the fossil fuels sector and thus potentially postponing the
energy system transition implied by the two-degree target.
New employment may not need to be limited to the energy
sector, however. Michaelowa (2005) cited above showed how ship-
builders joined the energy sector by starting to build wind turbines; a
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Fig. 1. Simulated support levels for mitigation measures over employment sector.
The ﬁgure shows simulated support levels based on the regression models detailed
shown in Table 3. For each model, 1000 simulations have been run using the Clarify
software (Tomz et al., 2003), representing unweighted results. Aside from the
Oilwork variable, which takes values of zero or one, all explanatory variables have
been held at their means.
E. Tvinnereim, E. Ivarsﬂaten / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 364–371370reverse direction, for example from fossil energy to toward low-
emission shipping, is also imaginable for current oil and gas workers
skilled in maritime construction. One possible extrapolation of the
main result of this article is that those employed in fossil fuel ex-
traction are as favorably inclined to energy-related mitigation as
everybody else as long as alternative areas in which to gainfully
employ their skills can be found. Or, stated less positively, individuals
working in fossil fuel-intensive sectors are likely to resist climate
mitigation policies if the prospects of alternative employment are
weak, making a successful transition unlikely without signiﬁcant
employment growth outside fossil fuels.Data deposition
Replication data and code are available at the Harvard Data-
verse Network (Publication no. doi/10.7910/DVN/ECCJOB). The full
data set is also available from the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services (NSD): http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsddata/serier/norsk_med
borgerpanel.html.Acknowledgements
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1. Battery questions, common introduction
We would now like to ask your opinion on certain measures
that have been proposed to reduce climate change. Many experts
believe that the measures mentioned below will work. However,there may be disagreement on whether these are good measures
to implement. How positive or negative are you towards the
measures mentioned here?
Common response scale for these battery questions:
Very positive - Positive - Somewhat positive - Neither positive
nor negative - Somewhat negative - Negative - Very negative
1.1 Oil tax regime (variables w01_km13_5 and w01_km13_6 )
a. Reduce tax incentives for oilﬁeld exploration.
b. Tighten tax rules for oilﬁeld exploration.
1.2 Tighten CO2 cap (variables w01_km13_1 and w01_km13_2)
a. Tighten the rules for how much CO2 industry in Norway and
Europe may emit.
b. Tighten the rules for how much CO2 industry in Norway and
Europe may emit, by cutting the total number of permits that
these may use.
1.3 CCS (w01_km13_3 and w01_km13_4)
a. Increase the effort to capture and store CO2 under the seabed
or the Earth's surface.
b. Increase the effort to capture and store CO2 under the seabed
or the Earth's surface, as done for example in the so-called "moon
landing" project at [the] Mongstad [reﬁnery in Western Norway].
The wording difference has no effect on responses (see Tvin-
nereim and Steinshamn, 2016); hence no dummy variable has
been included in regressions.
1.4 Offshore wind (w03_r3km37_2)
Increased government support for developing wind power at
sea (offshore wind power).
1.5 Geothermal (w03_r3km37_4)
Increased government support for developing geothermal en-
ergy where one drills down to the high temperatures under the
Earth's surface.
1.6 Biomass (w03_r3km37_3)
Increased government support for building biofuel facilities (for
example ﬁrewood, pellets, and biogas).
2. Questions without the common battery introduction
2.1 Lofoten drilling (w03_r3dvh_1)
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following
statements:
– We should not allow oil and gas extraction in the area around
Lofoten and Vesterålen.
Response options: Strongly agree – Agree – Somewhat agree –
Neither agree nor disagree – Somewhat disagree – Disagree –
Strongly disagree.
2.2 Reduce oil production (w02_km213a and w02_km213b)
Should Norway, in your opinion, reduce, maintain or increase
its oil production in a climate perspective?
Response options: Reduce, Maintain, Increase.
Coded so that Reduce¼1; Maintain¼0; Increase¼0.
3. Work in oil/gas sector (w01_k24 and w03_r3k24)
Is your workplace in the oil and gas sector, or closely related to
it?
Response options:
1. Yes, I work in the oil and gas sector
2. Yes, my work is closely related to the oil and gas sector
3. No
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.05.052.References
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